I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most salient characteristics of an import quota is that it is a restriction on quantity and not a restriction on price. Hence the profit maximizing manufacturer would want to exploit maximal revenue opportunities within the framework of quantity restrictions. Feenstra (1988) and Morke & Tarr (1984) have shown that the imposition of a quota--in this case a voluntary export restraint (VER)--led Japanese automobile manufacturers to export higher quality cars at higher prices in order to offset the forgone profits incurred from the imposition of VER 1 . Hence the advent of a quota shifts the demand curve in favor of the relatively more affluent consumer and thus forces the displaced consumer to seek substitutes for those cars which are no longer available. This substitution can take the form of other imports or domestic automobiles 1 "...A major puzzle for the political economy of trade policy is to explain why such a seemingly self-punishing policy should have become the protectionist measure of choice in the last two decades...", Helpman & Krugman (1989) , pg 14.
which are competitively priced vis-a-vis the pre-quota restriction on imports. This paper focuses on the impact on of an import quota on domestic sales 2 . Even though the abstract model is applicable to import quotas in general, we use the applied setting of the pre-GATT 1994 U.S. automobile industry because it is the largest manufacturing sector in the U.S.. It assumes that a car is a durable good that is long lived. As a result relationship(s) exist between the market for new and used versions of the good. For example, the price that a car dealer gets depends not only on the current stock of new cars but also on consumer expectations about future stocks and their ability to trade in the secondary or used car market. However, an automobile also depreciates and this leads to the need for new replacement. A domestically made car is assumed to be substituted for a foreign car in each case.
Another impact of VERs would cause some consumers to purchase an automobile and hold it for a short period knowing that it could be resold in the used car market at anytime thereafter. The consumer stands to gain a premium if the real resale value is higher than the value of the car net of depreciation. Other consumers may postpone their consumption (purchase) of a new car and under extenuating circumstances they would elect to buy a "good used car" during the transition period between getting rid of the "old car" and the purchase of the new one. This scenario could be viewed as an intertemporal effect of smoothing consumption of a durable good -new cars. That is, a new car is bought and it begins to depreciate in market value since it cannot be stored 3 . The moment that the consumer decides to get a new car, if consumption is postponed because the de facto rationing of previously available cars "prices out" the consumer, then from that moment on the consumer is forced to drive a vehicle that he/she wants to replace but is liquidity constrained to keep. In that case, the effect is the same as buying a "good used car" until a new one can be bought. This stylized model will result in welfare and deadweight loss since other things being equal, the consumer is now at a lower demand curve and derives less utility from the old (used) car.
Section II discusses the model and assumptions. It is essentially a neoclassical model of imperfect competition, and partial equilibrium between firm and consumer. Fairly standard parametrization and approximation procedures are used to derive an estimate of the substitution effect. Section III analyzes the welfare effects of the import quota and derives a necessary condition for a naive policy maker's belief that an import quota would be welfare improving or at least welfare neutral. Section IV is the summary and it highlights issues for consideration in empirical implementation of the results in this paper.
Details about parametrization and deduction of equations are contained in the Appendix.
II. THE MODEL
The model is based on "symmetric substitution" 4 . It is a somewhat neoclassical model that uses the convexity of indifference contours over brands (domestic and foreign) to consumer preference for variety. It is assumed that high quality firms allocate more resources to quality control vis-a-vis low quality firms. Thus a smaller variance and greater average quality implies a higher marginal cost. The production of more units would lead to diminishing returns to investment in quality control beyond some point since economies of scale mitigate against the competitive firm's ability to provide more goods, other things being equal.
Consumer beliefs about quality will be based on imperfect information to some extent since advertising, sampling costs and "word-ofmouth" communications would introduce a certain element of uncertainty in the model. These sources of randomness in quality have led automobile manufacturers to offer more comprehensive warranties and consumer incentives to in effect signal quality. We assume that manufacturers are 4 See Krouse (1990) , pp 165.
faced with a self enforcing mechanism of firm reputation so that they will not knowingly palm off low quality goods at a high price 5 . We assume that products can differ only along a single quality dimension and that at a given price all consumers prefer more quality to less. That is, consumers are non-satiated in quality. It is assumed everywhere that the good in question is an automobile.
Goods characteristics
Consider a good, j, that is comprised of a characteristic vector z j = (z j1 z j2 ,...,z jN ). Here z jn is the amount of characteristic n in good j, n=1,2,...,N. Let  j be a design parameter such that changes in  j results in changes in z j . Hence z jn ( j ) reflects the impact of a design change in good j on characteristic n. We assume that z  = z'() > 0 6
Consumer market
Assume that consumers have quasi-convex preferences and that they are nonsatiated in quality. A representative consumer has an aggregate separable utility function 7 given by:
The inequality implies that z j 's are imperfect substitutes and that more variety leads to higher consumer utility. z 0 is a numeraire good and z is an N-vector of characteristics such that z = (z 1 ,z 2 ,...,z N ). One commonly used parametrization is the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) form of the utility function, 5 See Akerlof (1970) and Leland (1979) for quality pricing with imperfect information.
6 This assumption is reasonable since it implies that improvements in design leads to higher quality or at least an enlargement of the characteristic set.
7 See Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) .
This implies that the CES between any two characteristics is given by  = 1 1- and 0<<1 implies imperfect substitution between any two characteristics. Since 0<<1, there is declining marginal utility for each feature relative to all other features 8 . The change of variable v j = z j  and v =  j v j suggests that v is a composite features index associated with the product chosen by a given consumer.
Demand equations 9
The inverse demand function is derived from the first order conditions for consumer utility maximization. It utilizes constant marginal utility for the numeraire good and the marginal rate of substitution for characteristics (see Appendix I); z(.) is the quantity demanded and p(.)
is the corresponding price; p and z are N-vectors of prices and characteristics, respectively (see Appendix II, Figure 1) ; y is the income associated with the numeraire good z 0 (i.e y = p 0 z 0 ).
The firm
The foreign firm is faced with the domestic demand p(z,y) 10 for its product , a VER, M, and a cost curve C(M,z()) 11 . Feenstra (1988) proposed a class of homothetic cost functions with decreasing marginal cost for some characteristics when there is an increase in output. He postulated that the firm would find itself with unused fixed inputs when demand
, implies a declining rate in z j 9 Note that Breshahan (1981) developed a model for consumer demand for quality in the automotive industry by using a slightly different scheme.
10 Technically, the composition of characteristics of the z-vector for domestic and foreign cars are different due to the design parameter .
11 See Epple (1987) for further characteristics.
decreases due to the VER. This indicates that the firm moves along its cost curve to adjust for unused input capacity. That is, it upgrades the cars it produces with the previously unused inputs. Here we assume that domestic firms are faced with similar cost and demand functions. Domestic firms are assumed to be competitive.
The Substitution Effect 12
Let z(p,y) be the demand for cars before the imposition of a quota 13 .
In the advent of a quota, M , the price of cars increase from p to p' and 
III. WELFARE EFFECTS
Assume that a certain fraction,  16 , of the substitution effect goes to domestic producers. Then domestic sales increase by z s (.). In order for the quota to have at least a neutral effect on social welfare in the Bergsonian sense, the profits generated by the increase in domestic sales must offset the decrease in consumer surplus induced by the price increase 12 The computation of the substitution effect in this section is motivated by Varian (1990) .
13 p(z) is the inverse demand corresponding to z(p,y) where y is consumer income 14 It is important to note that here that the policy variable, M , is a shift parameter for the demand curve.
15 There is also an income effect z I = z(p',y) -z(p',y+y). However, this effect will not be analyzed here.
16 We can assume that  is a function of cross elasticity of demand between imports and exports or perhaps more appropriately domestic goods.
from demand shift and the quota rents that accrue to the foreign firms as a result of the VER. The welfare accounting for this stylized model of a naive import quota policy, endogenously determines an optimal VER.
Let W L be the welfare loss due to the VER. The welfare loss consists of the decrease in consumer surplus and the quota rents that accrue to foreign firms. The welfare gain, W G , comprises the increase in producer surplus (profits). The import quota is at least welfare neutral, if W G >= W L .
Social welfare analytics will proceed along the envelope of consumer utility and firm profit functions (see Appendix II, Figure 2 ). Hence we assume that after firms adjust their output levels to maximize profits and individuals move to optimize utility, the variable parameters are the endogenously determined import quota, M , and its concomitant design parameter, .
Let W G * = z s ( M ,) for some optimal level of firm profit and consumer utility. Here  is a constant that incorporates the proportion, , and the constant share of profits that accrue to domestic firms.
Similarly, let W L * = ( M ,) M + CS 0 () -CS 1 () 17 . If we totally differentiate so that dW G * >= dW L * , we get the following:
After some manipulation this relation reduces to:
Here we have a relationship between quota and design. If the quota goes up then we would expect the foreign firm to send relatively more lower grade cars since they would want to compete in the "fringe" market for lower 17 The last two terms are consumer surplus before and after the import quota, respectively. See Appendix I for further description and derivation of equations in this section. 
The numerator in [4] suggests that the bounds on VER depends on the rate of change of the difference in consumer surplus relative to the design of foreign cars, and the domestic firm's profit and market share times the rate of change of substitution relative to car design. In the denominator, it depends on the rate of quota rent accrual to foreign firms relative to foreign car design. The bound intuitively suggests that if a VER is to be at least welfare neutral then it must not exceed the limit shown. If it does, then the substitution effect diminishes and domestic firms get less of the "residual demand" induced by the VER (see Figure 3 , in Appendix) veil of a quota to increase the domestic price levels so that their heretofore overpriced cars would be priced to reflect higher domestic price levels. That is, a bottom up approach to automobile pricing can be generated here. If domestic cars are over priced then lobbyist can invoke a quota on foreign competetion to make the domestic price level come up to par with the over priced car. In a non-distorted economy, the burden would be put on the domestic producer to produce lower priced cars in order to be competitive. The assumptions and inferences derived thus far can be formally stated as follows: 
IV. SUMMARY
19 See prior definition of W *.
20 It may be possible to prove this proposition under more general and rigrous conditions. This paper presented a stylized model of naive protectionist policy in the form of an import quota. Many policy makers argue that domestic social welfare would be improved if import quotas are imposed on those goods for which domestic goods are at a competitive disadvantage. A necessary condition for this policy to be effective was determined and it was found to be intuitively appealing. However, the result may not be very stable since it depends on an unobservable substitution effect. A more comprehensive treatment of the topics in this paper would entail a more detailed development of the market structure in which this trade policy is to be implemented. Helpman & Krugman (1989) have shown that when this is done the results can be ambiguous.
Empirical implementation of the ideas expressed in this paper should be mindful of the pitfalls inherent in hedonic regressions which may be used to estimate demand equations (see Anderson (1985) , Atkinson & Halvorsen (1984 ), Blackley, et al (1984 , Epple (1987) ). Bresnahan (1981) outlined an alternative procedure relative to "pure" hedonic regressions.
Estimation of the substitution effect proceeds by estimating the price- 21 According to theory, these coefficients represent the marginal prices of the corresponding quality variables under an appropriate specification. If Japanese firms offer similar or more features than domestic firms and the price of their product is less, then one would expect the marginal price of features to be less.
APPENDIX I Consumer equations
In equilibrium, MRS = dU(.) dz i dU (.) dz 0 = p j p 0 , p 0 = 1 and dU(.) dz 0 is normalized to unity.
Equation [1] describes the marginal rate of substitution between a given characteristic and the numeraire good in consumer equilibrium. Equation 
Firm equations
The foreign firm faces a pre-VER demand p(z(),y) and a cost curve ,C(.), such that C M > 0, and C MM > 0. The firm's problem is as follows:
22 This is the import quota constraint equation.
The first order conditions for profit maximization leads to the following equations 23 :
where  is the quota rent for foreign firms or the markup of price over 
Welfare equations
The first term on the right of [6] is the quota rents that accrue to foreign firms. The second term is the decrease in consumer surplus 24 .
The first term on the right of 
